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I. INTRODUCTION
Most lawyers begin their careers with an oath of office that includes a pledge
never to "delay any man's cause for lucre or malice, So Help Me God."' The recent
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP or Rules) 2 demonstrate,
however, that the drafters believed many lawyers often breach this oath. Sometime
between their swearing-in ceremony and the swearing-in of their first witness, many
lawyers utilize discovery devices to delay proceedings and harass adversaries to the
point of settlement or even dismissal. A critique of such tactics has led to mixed
reviews, condoned by some as merely "zealous representation of clients," 4 and
criticized by others as the leading cause of inefficient administration of justice.5
Amended Rule 26,6 along with Rules 7, 11, and 16, was designed to reduce
1. E.g., SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR OF OHIO, Rule 1, § 7(A).
2. The Federal Rules were amended on August 1, 1983. For the complete text of the Amendments as they were
proposed and adopted, see Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
3. See generally P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN, & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE
PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978); Brazil, Civil Discovery: La syers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and
Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 798; Lundquist & Flegal, Discovery Abuse-Some New Views About an Old
Problem, 2 REV. LITGATION 1 (1981); Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 2 REV. LrrGATION 71
(1981); Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475; C. Ellington, A
Study of Sanctions for Discovery Abuse (May 11, 1979) (report submitted to the Office for Improvements in the
Administration of Justice, United States Department of Justice).
4. Renfrew, supra note 3, at 83.
5. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee note; Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D.
165, 216-17 (1983); see also Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 95
(1976).
6. Amended Rule 26 appears as follows. (Bracketed material has been deleted from and italicized material has been
added to the original rule.)
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY
(a) DISCOVERY METHODS. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: deposi-
tions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or
permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental
examinations; and requests for admission. [Unless the court orders otherwise under subdivision (c) of this rule,
the frequency of use of these methods is not limited.]
(b) [SCOPE OF DISCOVERY] DISCOVERY SCOPE AND Limrrs. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court
in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: (1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is
not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The frequency or extent of use of
the discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or
expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties'
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c).
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discovery abuse and to expedite litigation by encouraging judges to impose, and
lawyers to seek, sanctions for improper use of discovery.7 This Comment will ex-
plore the need for and effect of new Rule 26(g) and evaluate whether the drafters
applied "a scalpel [or] or meat-ax" 8 to the problem of discovery abuse. This Com-
ment also will discuss the problems most likely to plague Rule 26(g)'s policy of
promoting sanctions for discovery abuse. These problems include: whether the type
and extent of abuse warrants the stringent provisions of the new Rule; whether the
sanctioning process itself will engender so much satellite litigation that the second
purpose of the amendments, expediting litigation, will be nullified; whether the
standards of reasonableness and due process are sufficiently circumscribed to prevent
abuse of judicial discretion in imposing sanctions; and whether the Rules can succeed
despite the continuing adversarial nature of the American litigation system.
Amended Rule 26 assumes that imposing sanctions will deter discovery abuse
and thus produce more effective and efficient administration of civil justice. If these
assumptions are correct, the new Rule may prove a beneficial tool to judges in their
efforts to trim the ever-increasing costs of litigation. If, however, attorneys twist the
tenor of the amendments or if judges fail to accept the new responsibilities imposed
by the Rules, new Rule 26(g) could provide merely another weapon of harassment
and delay.
A. History of Amendments
In 1947, less than ten years after the Rules first were enacted, the Supreme
Court, in Hickman v. Taylor,9 opened what has become a Pandora's box of discovery
abuse by declaring that the federal rules were to be "accorded a broad and liberal
treatment." 10 The Court defended the discovery mechanism provided by Rules 26
(Subdivisions (b)(2)-(4), (c), (d), (e), and (f) were not affected by the 1983 Amendments and are not reproduced
here.)
(g) SIoN NG OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS, RESPONSES AND OBJEcriONS. Every request for discovery or
response or objection thereto made by a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign the request, response, or objection and state his address. The signature of the attorney or party
constitutes a certification that he has read the request, response, or objection, and that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
(2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs
of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or objection and
a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or
objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
7. See Excerpt from the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report
from the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, Appendix C, 97 F.R.D. 165, 190-94 (1983).
8. Sherman & Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80's-Making the Rules Work, 2 REv. LmGATtON 9, 36
(1981).
9. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
10. ld. at 507.
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through 37 as "one of the most significant innovations"" of the relatively ne*v rules
of civil procedure and confidently declared that:
No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party
from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.'
2
Despite hopes that "[t]he combination of simplified pleading and extensive
discovery [would] expediate dispositions,"' 3 the Hickman 4 decision instead gave
impetus to the "expansion of the scope of discovery and . . . relaxation of controls
over the frequency and timing of discovery requests."1 5 As a result, litigants learned
to use the language in Hickman as a lever to open doors to discovery abuses of which
the drafters of the Rules never dreamed.
In recent years, however, the Court has recognized that discovery has "not
infrequently [been] exploited to the disadvantage of justice."1 6 In National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, " the Court acknowledged the harm caused by
discovery abuse and enunciated a new purpose for awarding sanctions against liti-
gants who misuse the discovery mechanism-deterrence of future abuse. In National
Hockey League, the Court upheld the district court's decision under FRCP 37 to
dismiss the respondent's antitrust action for failing to comply with the district court's
discovery order.' 8 The district court found that respondent's failure to answer written
interrogatories for more than seventeen months in the face of repeated admonitions by
the court to comply with its orders constituted flagrant abuse of the discovery proc-
ess. 19 In affirming the dismissal, the Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of
imposing sanctions for discovery abuse is not only to penalize offenders, but also to
deter others from similar conduct in the future.2 0
Commentators also argued that discovery abuse had grown to such proportions
that the purposes of discovery no longer were served. 2' At the 1976 National Con-
ference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
Chief Justice Burger reported that "after more than 35 years' experience with pretrial
procedures, we hear widespread complaints that they are being misused and over-
11. Id. at 500.
12. Id. at 507.
13. P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN, & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 3, at 8; see also W. GISER, PRETRIAL DiscovERY
AND THE ADVERSARY SYsTEM 79 (1968).
14. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
15. P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 3, at 9.
16. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
17. 427 U.S. 639 (1979) (per curiam).
18. Id. at 643.
19. Id. at 640.
20. Id. at 643. The Court emphasized that "the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided ... must be
available ... not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those
who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent." Id. See generally Note, The Emerging
Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978).
21. E.g., Sherman, The Judge's Role in Discovery, 3 REV. LMGATION 89, 195-97 (1982) ("Judge Goettel:
Discovery was intended to be a domesticated bird dog to help flush out evidence. It has become, instead, a voracious wolf
roaming the countryside, eating everything in sight." Id. at 196-97.).
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used.' '22 The Chief Justice concluded that "[t]he responsibility for correcting this lies
with lawyers and judges, for the cure is in our hands." 23
Two major criticisms were leveled at the discovery provisions. The first criti-
cism is that they are susceptible to misuse. Attorneys regularly delay responding to
interrogatories and document requests until their adversary threatens to move for an
order compelling production. When a response finally is made, attorneys are careful
to construe every request as narrowly or as broadly as necessary to provide their
opponent with the least possible amount of useful information.24 The alternative,
promptly and willingly providing all the information requested, is considered by most
attorneys to be a breach of their ethical duty to represent their client zealously.
25
Depositions provide another example of the Rules' susceptibility to misuse. In
deciding whether a person should be deposed, attorneys often consider geographic
locations or business and personal relationships to a party more important than
knowledge of relevant information. 26 The location and timing of a deposition can be a
tactical weapon designed to harass or annoy an opponent. 27 Practicing attorneys
probably would not consider such tactics misuses of discovery, yet these tactics
clearly do not comport with the Rules' general aim to "secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.' 28
The second criticism stems from the ease with which the discovery provisions
can be overused. Overuse occurs when attorneys, who are often people with
perfectionist-compulsive tendencies, 29 become so anxious about discovering every
possible piece of information, whether relevant or not, that they submit colossal
discovery requests. An extraordinary number of depositions are scheduled, vast
document requests are sent, and thousand-page interrogatories are filed by attorneys
demonstrating an "insensitivity to cost and an inability to leave even the most remote
stone unturned.' '30
In 1980, a divided Supreme Court responded to these criticisms by amending,
among others, "the cluster of Rules authorizing and regulating discovery gener-
22. Burger, supra note 5. at 95.
23. Id. at 96: see also Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force. 74 F.R.D. 159 (1976): Burger. The State
of the Judiciarv-1970. 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 932 (1970).
24. See generally Brazil, supra note 3, at 832-59.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 176-79.
26. See generally Brazil, supra note 3. at 832-59.
27. One well-respected legal services attorney reported scheduling a client's deposition to be taken at the attomey's
storefront offices. The offices were located in an area with a very high crime rate. and the attorney scheduled the
deposition shortly before sundown in hopes of persuading his wealthier, suburban opponent to cancel the deposition, or at
least to make it a short session so they would be finished before dark. Conversely, the same attorney complained of an
opponent in a wife-beating case who insisted on discovering the new address and telephone number of the attorney's
battered client, in hopes that the client would drop the assault charges rather than reveal her new whereabouts. Conversa-
tion with a legal services attorney, Fall, 1983.
28. FED. R. Ctv. P. I.
29. This phenomenon is described by Professor Wayne Brazil in his 1979 American Bar Foundation study of
discovery abuse and is attributed to the fact "'that people with 'perfectionist-compulsive' tendencies often perform very
well in law school ... and are likely to be attracted by the challenges and rewards ... of big case litigation.- Brazil.
Views fromn the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discorer. 1980 Amt. B. FoU.ND,
RSEARCH J. 219. 239. The theory is that *'[blecause litigators with these psychological characteristics are especially
anxious about making errors of omission . . . they are particularly prone to develop elaborate systematic procedures for
attacking all litigation problems." Id.
30. Schroeder & Frank. supra note 3. at 489.
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ally,",3 1 but Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist, along with a host of legal
commentators, 32 were unimpressed. The amendments were described as the applica-
tion of "a Band-Aid where outright surgery was called for" 33 and Justice Powell
doubted they would "have an appreciable effect on the acute problems associated
with discovery."- 34 Powell summarized his dissatisfaction by warning that "accep-
tance of these tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption of genuinely
effective reforms" 35 and "will create complacency" 36 that "could postpone effec-
tive reform for another decade."
37
Even before the furor over the 1980 Amendments receded, the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Civil Rules began work on a new set of revisions. 38 In early September,
1982, the Advisory Committee proposed and the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure approved for submission to the Judicial Conference, further changes in the
Rules. 39 The Judicial Conference adopted the proposals on September 26, 1982 and
submitted them to the United States Supreme Court.4 ° On April 28, 1983, the Court
adopted the proposed amendments and forwarded the changes to Congress.4 ' Under
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 2072, amendments to the Rules take effect
automatically within ninety days after they are submitted to Congress unless both
Houses act to block their passage.4 2 Despite a last-ditch effort by the House of
Representatives to delay the effective date until December,43 through Congressional
inaction, the amendments to Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26 became effective on August 1,
1983. 44
B. Description of the 1983 Amendments
"Aggressive judicial control" over the management of civil cases is the com-
mon thread tying the 1983 amendments to Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26 together. 45 The
drafters apparently believed that assigning increased managerial duties to federal
31. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995. 997 (1980).
32. id. (Powell, J.. dissenting). See generally Section of Litigation. American Bar Association. Second Report of
the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse (Jan., Nov. 1980). 92 F.R.D. 137-48 (1980).
33. Marcus. Abuses Curbed? Court OKs Changes in Discovery-But Dissenters Argue Reforms in Civil Rules Don't
Go Far Enough. Nat'l L.J., May 12. 1980, at I. col. 4.
34. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995. 998 (1980) (Powell. J.. dissenting).
35. Id. at 1000.
36. Id,
37. Id.
38. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Preliminary Draft 1981), 90 F. R.D. 451 (1981).
39. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF
THE UNITED STATES. CHAIRMAN; AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TttE UNITED STATES. 97 F.R.D. 165,
189 (Sept.. 1982).
40. Id. at 189 (1983).
41. 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
42. For a general description of the amendment process and its history, see Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and
Discovery Reform: The Continuing Need for An Umpire, 31 S'YRACU E L. REv. 543 (1980).
43. H.R. 3497, 98th Cong.. Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 4895, 5560 (1983); see also Pike. Federal Rules Delay
Erpeced-Bill May Hold Up Anendinentsfor Six Months. Nat'l L.J., August 8. 1983, at 7. col. 2: Legal Times, July 4,
1983. at 2. col, I.
44. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 103 S. Ct. No. 16. at I (Apr. 28, 1983) (yellow pages).
Rules 6(b). 52(a), 53(a). (b). and (c), and 67 also were amended, and new Rules 53(0. 72-76 and new Official Forms 33
and 34 were added.
45. FEo. R. Ctv. P. II. 16, & 26 advisory committee notes.
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exhorting them to exercise greater control over the cases and litigants appearing
before them will lead to reduced abuse of discovery and the civil judicial process
generally. To this end, the Rules have been amended to hold attorneys to a higher
standard of culpability in judging the reasonableness of their conduct and judges to a
stricter standard in enforcing the new requirements of the Rules.
A new subsection requiring all motions to "be signed in accordance with Rule
11'46 has been added to Rule 7, and the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 7 refer
explicitly to the "amplified" sanctions in Rule l1.' Rule 11 itself requires an
attorney or a party not represented by an attorney to sign every pleading, motion, or
other paper filed with the court.48 This signature certifies that the attorney has read
the pleading, has made reasonable inquiry to ensure the pleading is "well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument" of what the law
should be, and that the attorney is not filing the pleading for purposes of harassing,
delaying, raising the cost of litigation, or for any other "improper" purpose.49 Most
importantly, the Rule now provides that if any pleading or other paper is signed in
violation of the above requirements, the court shall impose sanctions on either the
signer, the client, or both." ° The Advisory Committee Notes state the drafters'
intention "to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions . . . by emphasiz-
ing the responsibilities of the attorney . . ." and add that the "rule should eliminate
any doubt as to the propriety of assessing sanctions against the attorney." 5 ' Although
discovery motions are covered under Rule 11, the Advisory Committee Notes explain
that all other discovery papers relating to discovery are to be governed by Rule
26(g).52
New Rule 16 has been renamed "Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Manage-
ment" and requires a judge to issue a scheduling order, including a discovery sched-
ule, within 120 days after a complaint is filed, unless the suit falls within narrow local
district court exemptions.5 3 The Rule lists the objectives of and subjects to be dis-
cussed at pretrial conferences. 54 Like Rules I 1 and 26, Rule 16 provides for the
imposition of sanctions.5 5 The drafters expressly stated that "scheduling and case
management" are the goals of "pretrial procedure" 56 and emphasized that "explicit
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 7 advisory committee notes.
48. FED. R. C~r. P. 11.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee notes. For a discussion of the effects of amended Rule 11, see generally
Goodman, The New Discovery Rules: Sanctions Mandatedfor Pleading and Discovery Abuse, 31 R.I.B.J. 3 (Apr. 1983);
Hall, New Rules Amendments Are Far Reaching, 69 A.B.A. J. 1640 (Nov. 1983); Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and
Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363
(Mar. 1983); Sussman, Changes in Federal Rules Create Risks, Opportunities, Legal Times, Sept. 19, 1983, at 34, col. 1;
Pike, supra note 43; Patton, Discovery Rule Changes May Open the Door for New Litigation, L.A. Daily J., May 24,
1983, at 4, col. 3; Patton, New Rules Intended to Streamline Pretrial Process, Legal Times, May 16, 1983, at 14, col. 1;
Lemer & Schwartz, Why Rule II Shouldn't Be Changed-The Proposed Cure Might Exacerbate the Disease, Nat'l L.J.,
May 9, 1983, at 13, col. I; Dombroff, Objective Procedures Could Curb Discovery Abuse, Legal Times, Sept. 6, 1982, at
15, col. 1.
52. FED. R. Cry. P. II advisory committee notes.
53. FED. R. Cry. P. 16(b).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), (c).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) advisory committee notes.
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reference to sanctions reenforces [sic] the rule's intention to encourage forceful
judicial management. ' 57
Although all the amendments are designed to reduce the delays and expenses
associated with civil suits by encouraging greater judicial involvement in the litiga-
tion process, the three changes in Rule 26 directly attack what often is considered the
greatest cause of expense and delay-dicovery abuse. Significantly, the final sen-
tence in 26(a), which stated that "[u]nless the court orders otherwise . . . . the
frequency of use of these methods is not limited," has been deleted.5 s Instead, Rule
26(b), now subtitled "Discovery Scope and Limits," includes a new paragraph
providing that the "frequency or extent" of discovery "shall be limited by the court"
whenever certain circumstances exist.5 9 Rule 26(b)(I)(i) directs the court to limit any
discovery that is found to be "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative" or that can be
obtained from a more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive source.
60
Likewise, under subdivision (b)(1)(ii), the court must limit discovery when the dis-
coveror "has had ample opportunity" through previous discovery efforts "to obtain
the information sought."'' 6 The Advisory Committee Notes explain that the new
standards are designed to reduce repetitiveness while adjuring lawyers to consider the
comparative costs of different discovery methods.
62
Of all the 1983 Amendments, however, subdivision (b)(1)(iii) of Rule 26
appears likely to produce the most litigation as parties and judges struggle to apply its
disproportionality standard. 63 Under this section, a judge is to limit "unduly burden-
some or expensive" discovery requests after considering "the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, . . . the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues
at stake.' 64 Although the standards seek to prevent "discovery . . . disproportionate
to the individual lawsuit," the Advisory Committee Notes warn courts not to limit
"discovery that is reasonably necessary to afford a fair opportunity to develop and
prepare the case."
65
The addition of subdivision (g), entitled "Signing of Discovery Requests, Re-
sponses and Objections," to Rule 26 parallels the language in amended Rule 11.66
Every attorney or unrepresented party must certify, by signing every discovery docu-
ment, that the discovery request, response, or objection is:
(1) consistent with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] and warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
(2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause un-
necessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and
(3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) advisory committee notes.
58. FED. R. Cry. P. 26(a).
59. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(1).
60. FED. R. COv. P. 26(b)(1)(i).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(ii).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee notes.
63. Id.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(iii).
65. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b) advisory committee notes.
66. FeD. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
1985]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation.
67
The rule requires a judge to impose "appropriate" sanctions for violations of the
above certification requirements "including a reasonable attorney's fee.' '68 Thus,
amended Rule 26 provides the court with two important wtapons against discovery
abuse. First, Rule 26(b) authorizes the court to limit discovery whenever certain
conditions are found, and second, Rule 26(g) directs the court to impose sanctions on
either the attorney, the party, or both, if any of its requirements are not met. Whether
these weapons will prove effective, or even necessary, remains to be seen.
II. THE PRE-AMENDMENT SANCTIONING PROCESS
The stated purpose for Rule 26(g)'s "explicit" sanctioning authority is to over-
come the historical reluctance of many federal judges to involve themselves in the
discovery process or to impose sanctions for even clear abuses of that process. 69 In
Societg Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers70
the Supreme Court stated that a court's "power to dismiss a complaint because of
noncompliance with a production order depends entirely upon Rule 37. . . . Reliance
upon . . . 'inherent power' . . . only obscure[s] analysis of the problem." 7' Many
courts mistakenly construed the decision as indicating that only sanctions expressly
mentioned in Rule 37 were appropriate for punishing discovery infractions and fur-
ther, as supporting their reluctance to impose any sanctions. 72 The Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to Rule 26(g) rest this authority firmly on "Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. Section
1927, and the court's inherent power," 73 thus silencing the debate raised by Societg
Internationale.
The "asserted reluctance" 74 on which the drafters relied has been amply de-
scribed by the commentators. In 1978, Paul Connolly, Edith Holleman, and Michael
Kuhlman from the Federal Judicial Center 75 surveyed six metropolitan courts and
reported that motions for sanctions were made in fewer than one percent of the cases
in which requests for discovery were made.76 Of these, less than forty percent were
granted. 77 Similarly, a 1979 study for the Federal Justice Research Program of the
Department of Justice found that judges surveyed in the Northern District of Georgia
and the Northern District of Illinois assigned a low priority to using sanctions to deter
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee notes.
70. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
71. Id. at 207.
72. See generally Note, Federal Procedure: Due Process Limitations on Discovery Sanctions, 46 CAL. L. REv. 836,
838-39 (1958); Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. Cm. L. REv.
619, 633-36 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Sanctions Imposed].
73. Id. For a discussion of the sanctioning authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra note 110.
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee notes.
75. P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN, & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 3.
76. Id. at 34.
77. Id. at 18-26.
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discovery abuse. 78 Over eighty-five percent of the judges said they "seldom" or
"never" awarded expenses in motions brought under Rule 37(a). 7 9
The withdrawal of courts from the frontlines of discovery battles has drawn
criticism from lawyers and judges alike. One federal judge blamed the courts "for
much of the abuse, in the sense that they do nothing about it" 80 and claimed that
"[m]any judges see themselves in the role of an umpire who simply sits there and lets
the players play the game." 8 ' Professor Wayne Brazil's 82 study of approximately
180 Chicago-area lawyers 83 indicates, however, that most of the players would like a
bit more attention from the umpires. 84 Professor Brazil found that most of the lawyers
surveyed believed the courts "fail[ed] to deliver effective assistance in solving dis-
covery problems" and that most were "transparently reluctant to impose
sanctions. ' 85 The lawyers complained that even "when sanctions are imposed
they ... are too mild to serve as significant deterrents" 86 and several lawyers re-
ported judges who "require[d] at least three failures to respond to the same clearly
legitimate discovery request before ...consider[ing] ...a motion for
sanctions."87
One of the reasons for this apparent abdication of authority may be that some
courts are unaware that the "power to impose money awards . . . has long been a
weapon available ... 88 As Judge John F. Grady, District Judge for the Northem
District of Illinois, noted in a 1982 interview: "Believe it or not, there are judges who
don't know they already have [the] power" to curb discovery abuse. 89 Because the
new Rule itself confers no new authority, its purpose has been described as encour-
aging "practices that have been employed by many judges for years ...
[by] ...stimulat[ing] ...substantially increased activity on the part of judges who
have not used their existing power to the utmost.' 90 The drafters recognized that the
amended Rule reflect[s] the existing practice of many courts' but emphasized that
"[o]n the whole, however, district judges have been reluctant to limit the use of the
discovery devices." 91 Many commentators expect Rule 26(g) "to stimulate all courts
to begin doing what the activist courts have already been doing for some time.'"92
78. C. Ellington, supra note 3.
79. Id. at 55.
80. Huffman, Protracted Litigation, Abuses ofDiscovery Targeted by Judge, Legal Times, July 26, 1982, at 1, col.
1. at 32 (interview with Judge John F. Grady, N.D. ILl.).
81. Id.
82. Wayne D. Brazil is Professor of Law, Hastings College of Law, University of California, San Francisco;
Affiliated Scholar, American Bar Foundation. B.A., 1966, Stanford University; M.A., 1967, Ph.D., 1975, Harvard
University; J.D., 1975, University of California, Berkeley. Professor Brazil was the project director of the American Bar
Foundation pilot study that assessed the effectiveness of the civil discovery system.
83. Brazil, supra note 29.
84. Id. at 247.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 248.
88. Batista, New Discipline in Old Game--Sanctions for Discovery Abuse, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
89. Huffman, supra note 80.
90. Marcus, supra note 51, at 364.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee notes.
92. Marcus, supra note 51, at 364.
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Another explanation for the dearth of judicial activity in this area is "[tihe
enormous reluctance of judges to evaluate the merits of cases before trial." 93 As a
Committee Report to the New York City Bar Association explained, judges seldom
utilize sanctions that "adversely affect the substance of a party's claims or de-
fenses . . . [because they] are reluctant to dismiss meritorious claims or defenses as a
penalty for'discovery abuse. 94 As one commentator noted, however, a party's right
to have its action decided on the merits "is not unqualified." 95 There is "a corre-
sponding right to have a prompt and inexpensive determination.... When one party
abridges the rights of the other, courts should not hesitate to impose sanctions such as
dismissal, default, or preclusion that affect the ultimate result.' '96
A related explanation for the judicial reluctance lies in the range of sanctions
available prior to the adoption of Rule 26(g) and the courts' perceptions of their
purpose and severity. In the past, courts considering sanctions for discovery abuse
usually referred to Rule 37. Under 37(d), sanctions may be imposed immediately
only for total and complete failure to respond to a discovery request. 97 If a party has
responded at all, a lawyer seeking sanctions must go through a laborious two-step
procedure-first, moving under 37(a) for an order compelling the discovery re-
quested, and then, if the order is violated, moving for sanctions against the recalci-
trant party. 98
The range of sanctions available is listed in Rule 37(b)(2) according to their
severity, and includes the following: (a) an order designating certain matters or facts
established for purposes of the action;9 9 (b) an order refusing to allow the party to
support or oppose certain claims or defenses;10 0 (c) an order prohibiting a party from
introducing certain matters into evidence;'0 ' (d) an order striking pleadings, staying
proceedings, dismissing the action, or rendering a default judgment. 10 2 In addition,
the rule indicates that other sanctions may be appropriate. 103
In the past, courts tended to avoid the sanctions of dismissal or default judg-
ment, usually because they perceived that sanctions were intended to remedy, not
deter, misconduct. Courts therefore felt "compelled to choose. .. the least severe
sanction necessary to achieve narrow remedial goals." 104 However, this may reflect
the "misconception that [lesser sanctions] are necessarily less severe than dismissal
or default judgments." 10 5 As one commentator explained:
93. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 6 LITIGATION Winter 1980, at 6.
94. Committee on State Courts of Superior Jurisdiction. Proposals to Minimize the Need for Court Intervention in
the Discovery Process, 37 REC. N.Y. CITY B.A. 535, 550 (Oct. 1982).
95. Renfrew, supra note 3, at 86.
96. Id.
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a), (B).
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
101. Id.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
104. Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1033, 1041 (1978).
105. Id. at 1041 n.52.
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Under certain circumstances "lesser" sanctions can achieve at least equally harsh
results. Moderate fines imposed against a party without adequate resources might result in
greater hardship than a litigation-ending sanction imposed against a wealthy party. Sim-
ilarly, taking a fact as established or prohibiting a party from contesting or raising an issue
may unavoidably lead to dismissal or default,... and thus may be as harsh as the
"ultimate" sanction itself.1t 6
Recently, however, this trend has reversed as federal judges have begun taking a
more active role in pretrial case management.10 7 Spurred on, perhaps, by the Su-
preme Court's admonition in National Hockey League10 8 that sanctions are an appro-
priate means not only in curbing discovery abuse, but also in deterring it, '0 9 more and
more judges have been using Rule 37, contempt proceedings, 28 U.S.C. Section
1927,110 and their own inherent power to stop excessive and abusive discovery. "' In
many ways, therefore, the new rules of procedure are reflective, rather than predic-
tive, of efforts by the courts to impose discipline on litigants.
III. SCALPEL OR MEAT-AX?-DISSECTING THE AMENDMENTS
As the Advisory Committee Notes indicate, "The premise of Rule 26(g) is that
imposing sanctions on attorneys who fail to meet the rule's standards will signifi-
cantly reduce abuse by imposing disadvantages therefor." 112 Various studies and
commentaries have examined the extent to which discovery abuse occurs, the dele-
terious effects caused by it, and the potential impact of sanctions on both its causes
and effects.
113
Despite the drafters' belief that "[e]xcessive discovery and evasion or resistance
to reasonable discovery requests pose significant problems," 114 some disagreement
exists over the extent and significance of discovery abuse. "5 United States Congress-
man Peter Rodino, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, in bringing his bill to
106. Id. at 1039 n.44.
107. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (court imposed attorney fees directly against
counsel for failing to comply with court order to respond to discovery request claiming authority under Rule 37(b) and its
inherent power to supervise proceedings before it); In re Hartford Textile Corp., 681 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(award of double costs and $5000 against attorney for "repetitive and demonstrably vexatious" conduct); United States v.
Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980) (imposing monetary sanctions on government attorney
personally under Rule 37 despite inability to impose them directly against the United States for failure to respond to a
discovery order); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979)
(gross negligence, short of willfulness, held to support district court order precluding evidence tantamount to a Rule 37
dismissal); Batista, supra note 87; Tell, Magistrate Threatens U.S. Over Delays in Discovery, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 26, 1982,
at 34, col. 3; Tell, Legal Fee Axed for Litton Case Discovery Abuse, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 12, 1981, at 2, col. 4; Tybor,
'Runaway Discovery' Draws Appellate Rebuke, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
108. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam).
109. Id. at 643.
110. Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that: "Any attorney or other person admitted to
conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to
increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs." 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (1970). For a discussion of how this section has been used, see Note, Sanctions Imposed, supra note 72, at
623-29.
111. See Note, Sanctions Imposed, supra note 72.
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee notes.
113. See generally P. CoNNoLLY, E. HoLi.ssAN & M. KUHtaAN, supra note 3; Brazil, supra note 29; Brazil, supra
note 3; Renfrew, supra note 3, at 72.
114. Fus. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes.
115. See Levine, "Abuse" of Discovery: or Hard Work Makes Good Law, 67 A.B.A. J. 565 (May 1981).
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defer the amendments' effective date, told reporters that although the new Rules are
"intended to cure perceived abuses in the discovery process . . . 'there is dispute
about the extent of any alleged abuse."1 16 The 1976 Report of the Pound Con-
ference Follow-Up Task Force"17 emphasized the need for "[e]mpirical data concern-
ing the types of cases in which abuse is most likely to occur, the nature and extent of
the abuse, and the utility of remedies which have been tried."" 8 Studies such as
Professor Brazil's" 9 followed, but commentators argue that the studies fall far short
of convincing evidence. Despite Professor Brazil's pronouncement that "it would be
difficult to exaggerate the pervasiveness of evasive practices or their adverse impact
on the efficiency or effectiveness of civil discovery,"' 20 at least one law professor
believes that the reports have been exaggerated. '21 Pointing to the theatrical nature of
trial lawyers and their overwhelming desire to litigate in a courtroom instead of in a
deposition room, Professor Levine122 questioned the pervasiveness of the reported
abuses.' 23 He further emphasized that the empirical studies which show that abuse
does occur also show that it occurs mainly in complex, protracted lawsuits. 124 Pro-
fessor Levine is not alone. One commentator dryly observed:
These striking changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are constructed on a
rather narrow edifice .... Brazil's research, widely relied upon by the Advisory Com-
mittee, consisted of interviews of 180 litigators in the Chicago area. Even within that
context, the greatest complaints identified discovery abuse in the so-called "big
cases." 1
25
A trial lawyer, contemplating the need for cheaper and simpler discovery, agreed,
noting that "[p]reoccupation with [techniques characteristic of large, complex cases]
should not dominate the general effort to reform discovery abuses."
12 6
There may be a logical explanation for the lack of hard data proving the extent
and amount of discovery abuse. The very nature of discovery abuse renders it diffi-
cult, sometimes impossible, to detect or prove. 127 Even those who believe abuse is a
"significant problem" acknowledge that "[r]eal discovery abuse is not com-
mon." 128 Rather, it is "sporadic, but very serious where it occurs." 129 One of the
116. Pike, supra note 43.
117. The Report of the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force was a report of a study conducted in response to
Chief Justice Burger's remarks at the 1976 Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, commonly referred to as the Pound Conference. The Follow-Up Report is reprinted at 74 F.R.D. 159 (1976).
Chief Justice Burger's comments are reprinted in Burger, supra note 5.
118. Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, supra note 23, at 192.
119. Brazil, supra note 3; Brazil, supra note 29; see text accompanying notes 82-87.
120. Brazil, supra note 3, at 789.
121. Levine, supra note 115, at 565-67.
122. Professor Julius B. Levine is a professor of law at Boston University School of Law.
123. Levine, supra note 115, at 565-67.
124. Id. at 567.
125. Goodman, supra note 51, at 5.
126. Kohn, Discovery Made Simpler (and cheaper), 6 LITIoATION Winter 1980, at 3.
127. Renfrew, supra note 93, at 5 ("My experience in civil litigation has convinced me that abuse ... while
difficult to detect and prove, is widespread. It occurs most often in discovery matters.").
128. Schroeder & Frank, supra note 3, at 477.
129. Id. at 478.
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commentators 130 upon which the Advisory Committee relied summarized the enigma
by explaining that "[t]he extent of discovery abuse is greatly exaggerated. However,
where it occurs, discovery abuse is tremendous." 13' This explanation is reflected in
findings by the 1978 Federal Judicial Center study:
Discovery abuse, to the extent it exists, does not permeate the vast majority of
federal filings. [A]buse-to the extent it exists-must be found in the quality of the
discovery requests not in the quantity.
[It is as] possible for a single discovery request to be abusive, as ... for sixty-two
requests to be appropriate, relevant and facilitative in the just disposition of
a ... case. 1
3 2
It appears, therefore, that the type or quality of discovery abuse contributes to the
delay and expense that the drafters of the amendments were hoping to cure.
Amended Rule 26 reflects not only the drafters' belief that the extent and amount
of abuse that occurs warrant the new provisions, but also the belief that imposing
sanctions will both detect and deter the type of abuse that occurs. An examination of
different discovery practices reveals, however, that judges and litigators differ in
their perceptions of which procedures rise to the level of an abuse. Matching the
drafters', the courts', and the litigators' definitions of abuse may prove a high hurdle
to overcome in making the new rules work.
One commentator distinguishes between "relatively small abuses . . . [that]
cost time and money but not a great deal" and "more serious incidents, in which
[the] cost may be very large, justice may be frustrated, and litigation enormously
protracted."1 33 The former, labeled "vexations,"' 134 usually result from attorneys
using discovery forms that are either "wildly inapplicable"' 35 or that request great
detail on marginal or unrelated matters.' 36 The latter, defined as "true abuse, '131
usually results from "colossal requests" and interrogatory evasion. 138 Professor
Brazil's 1980 study 13 9 identified the most frequently mentioned discovery abuses as
"evasive responses, withholding information, or noncompliance; overdiscovery; de-
lay; cost; harassment; interrogatories; incompetence or deficiencies of lawyers;
and . . . attorneys' economic motives."'' 40 The most common problem-producing
practices were described as:
-meter running (performing unnecessary work primarily for the purpose of milking
additional fees from clients) ....
-- overproduction of documents ....
130. Id.
131. Id. at 492 (quoting Judge Alvin Rubin).
132. P. CoNNoL.Y, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 3, at 35.






139. Brazil, supra note 3; Brazil, supra note 29.
140. Brazil, supra note 3, at 825.
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-identifying ... dozens of people who "have relevant information" when only one or
two know anything of real significance ....
-seeking more information ... than needed to have "something to compromise with"
if the opponent objects ....
-coaching deponents to wander off on harmless, tangential subjects to distract... and
consume time ....
-conducting discovery .. not to acquire relevant evidence but to pressure an opponent
to settle ....
-using discovery in one lawsuit to serve purposes beyond the pending litigation ....
-failure to develop early in litigation clear theories of liability or defense to guide
discovery efforts.'1
4
Professor Brazil also found three major "tactical purposes" motivating most of the
attorneys who admitted to these types of discovery practices.142 Eighty percent of the
attorneys interviewed agreed that "gaining time or slowing down part or all of an
action" was a frequent motive; seventy-seven percent said they used discovery to
impose "work burdens or economic pressure on another party or attorney;" and
eighty-six percent admitted to "distracting another party's attention from or obscur-
ing the existence of information." 143 Clearly, according to Professor Brazil's survey,
a majority of litigators freely admitted to discovery practices that would have pre-
vented them from signing in good faith a discovery request or response under new
Rule 26(g).
Surprisingly, however, an informal survey of Sixth Circuit judges in the North-
ern and Southern Districts of Ohio (Informal Judicial Survey), 144 conducted six
months after the new Rules went into effect, revealed not a single instance in which
the sanctioning authority of new Rule 26(g) had been used.145 Although most of the
judges agreed that the amendments to Rule 26 are warranted by the type and amount
of discovery abuse that they have encountered in the Sixth Circuit, few could point to
any specific abuse and at least one judge reported encountering little discovery
abuse. 146 Moreover, a majority of the judges responding to the survey said they did
not believe sanctions were necessary or appropriate when the attorney was not acting
in bad faith. 147 They indicated a belief that it was inappropriate for judges to impose
sanctions in cases involving merely non-willful misuse of discovery devices, as
opposed to purposeful misuse. 148 The judges also agreed that they did not expect the
new discovery rules to change either their caseloads or the conduct of discovery. 149
141. Brazil, supra note 29, at 235-36.
142. Brazil, supra note 3, at 852.
143. Id. at 852-54.
144. The Informal Judicial Survey, conducted by this author, polled Sixth Circuit appellate and district court judges
from the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio concerning the August 1983 amendments. The survey solicited the
judges' opinions on the shift in the Rules to greater court intervention, the purposes of discovery, the extent and types of
discovery abuse they have encountered, the standard of reasonableness required by the new Rules, the problem of
potential satellite litigation, and their own personal reactions to the amendments. The results of the survey are on file at the
editorial offices of the Ohio State Law Journal.
145. Informal Survey of Sixth Circuit Judges in the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, Feb. 1984 [hereinafter







One reason for the dearth of Rule 26(g) sanctions in Ohio courts may be that Ohio
litigators lag behind their Chicago counterparts in creative abuse of the discovery
process. Another possible explanation may be the relatively small sampling of judges
who chose to respond to the survey. The low participation level may reflect a defen-
sive posture among judges tired of being blamed for the inefficiencies and abuses of
modem litigation. The most likely explanation, however, is that the judges respond-
ing to the survey, like many federal judges across the country, do not define abuse as
broadly as the commentators.'
50
Another problem that could plague the new Rule's effectiveness, and which the
drafters themselves anticipated is satellite litigation. The Advisory Committee Notes
to Rules 11 and 26(g) admonish courts and litigants "[tlo assure that the efficiencies
achieved ... will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition
of sanctions . . . [by limiting] the scope of sanction proceedings to the record. 5 '
Discovery in sanction proceedings brought under Rule 26(g) "normally" will be
permitted "only when it is clearly required by the interests of justice."' 2 The
drafters believed that "[i]n most cases the court will be aware of the circumstances
and only a brief hearing should be necessary."'
153
While some legal commentators believe the new Rule contains only the potential
for adversaries to threaten each other with suits over sanctions, 154 other com-
mentators are firmly convinced that a "blizzard" of satellite litigation will result. 1
55
One writer warned that "[o]n a day-to-day basis, the worst effect of the new discov-
ery rules will be an explosion of 'satellite litigation.' "156 Participants at the Annual
Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit in October, 1983 agreed. The consensus
was that the new Rules would "generate so-called satellite litigation . . . 'complete-
ly corollary' to the original suit. .. ,,157 In complex cases especially, litigants
invoking the new Rule's sanctioning device could produce mini-trials over contested
items of information that cumulatively could last longer than the original action.
Sixth Circuit judges responding to the Informal Judicial Survey, however, ap-
parently do not believe satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions is or will be
as large an issue as predicted. 158 Most of the survey participants did not expect a large
amount of satellite litigation to result from Rule 26(g). One judge believed a signifi-
cant amount would occur but only in a select percentage of cases. 159 Another judge
believed that sanctioning under Rule 26(g) is a serious matter and one that deserves to
be litigated. The same judge, however, recognized the potential of having to impose
150. See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 126; Pegram, Discovery Sanctions, 51 ANTrmusT L.J. 431 (1982); Renfrew,
supra note 92; Gnmenberger, Discovery Abusers Have Many Bags Full of Tricks, Legal Times, July 4, 1983, at 18, col. 1.
151. FED. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee notes.
152. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g) advisory committee notes.
153. Id.
154. J. UNDERWOOD, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL DISCOVERY RuLEs 24 (Supp. 1983).
155. Goodman, supra note 51, at 4.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Alperson, New YorkAttorneys Criticize Discovery Reform Proposals, Legal Times, Oct. 10, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
158. Informal Judicial Survey, supra note 145.
159. Id.
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sanctions on attorneys for abusing the sanctioning process and agreed that such
circuitry "gets a little silly.' 160 Most of the judges responding placed their faith in
effective and meaningful pretrial conferences and discovery orders to prevent discov-
ery abuse before it occurs, rather than in sanctions. 16 1 Even if, through forceful case
management, courts avoid having their attention diverted "from the merits of a case
toward the tributary issue of counsel's conduct," ' 62 they will face other hurdles in
implementing the new rules.
The most difficult issues raised by the amendments are the standards to be
applied under the new Rules. Under Rule 26(g), a court is empowered to impose
sanctions against a party or attorney who fails to make a "reasonable inquiry" before
signing a discovery request, response, or objection.' 63 In determining whether the
duty to make a "reasonable inquiry" has been satisfied, the Advisory Committee
Notes state that an "objective standard" is to be applied.' 1 The duty is met "if the
investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions drawn therefrom are
reasonable under the circumstances." 1 65 Applying this objective standard on a case-
by-case basis, without varying the standard from district to district and even from
judge to judge within a district, appears impossible in practice. A court must decide
whether, in light of all the circumstances, an attorney's discovery activity is (1)
supported by an existing or good faith argument of law, (2) not designed for any
improper purpose, including harassment and delay, and (3) not unreasonable or
unduly burdensome or expensive under a vague, multi-factored, proportionality
standard. 16
6
Even if a court can justly determine whether the first two prongs of this test have
been met, the third prong, proportionality, requires a court to use either a crystal ball
or a large amount of guesswork. Under the proportionality standard, a court must
balance the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, 167 to decide
whether a party's request for discovery is reasonable and not unduly burdensome or
expensive.
The vagueness of the standard expressed in Rule 26(g) leaves many questions
unanswered. As Judge Schwarzer, District Judge for the Northern District of Califor-
nia, commented:
Who is to say that some novel theory of claim or defense is so far beyond the pale that it
cannot pass the tests of reasonableness and good faith under the newly revised rules 11
and 26(g)? Who can say with assurance that a far-fetched line of discovery may not
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Applying the reasonableness standard fairly to all parties may prove to be an im-
possibility.
The counter-argument, advanced by the participants of the Informal Judicial
Survey, is that few standards can be applied with perfect equity. Many of the judges
saw no difference between applying Rule 26(g)'s proportionality standard and de-
termining any other discretionary matter. One judge defended the rule by explaining
that making a reasonable inquiry is the "essence of judging."' 69 Another judge, who
believed he could apply the standard equitably, replied: "In human affairs, identical
circumstances never exist. The genius of the common law doctrine of reasonableness
is that it does not expect them to." 1
70
Standards do not have to be applied identically, however, just equally. The
guidelines given in Rule 26 may be too amorphous to be understood, let alone applied
in an evenhanded manner. For example, nowhere is the term "needs of a case"
defined, yet it is one of the four elements a court is required to balance in deciding
whether to impose sanctions for abuse of discovery. Given these obscurities, the
proportionality standard probably cannot be applied fairly or with any kind of certain-
ty or uniformity of result.
The drafters took a similar approach in determining the standard of due process
that must be met in the sanctioning process. The Advisory Committee Notes state that
"[t]he kind of notice and hearing required will depend on the facts of the case and the
severity of the sanction being considered."- 17 1 Determining the due process require-
ments to be met when different types of sanctions are imposed is left to the individual
court. Again the potential for disparity is tremendous. For example, if a contempt
sanction is imposed for its deterrence effect, one judge may decide that criminal
contempt proceedings are required, while another may view it as a civil proceeding
with merely civil due process requirements.' 72 The new Rule leaves unanswered the
question whether the imposition of punitive sanctions will require a court to avail the
offending party or attorney criminal due process rights. 173
The responses to the Informal Judicial Survey further illustrate the confusion.
Answers to a query concerning due process requirements under the new Rule ranged
from "I have no idea how the standard can be fairly applied," to requiring "full
notice and an opportunity for a full hearing, including the taking of testimony." 174
Most of the judges agreed the standard is one of fundamental fairness, but could
provide no specific answers on the type of due process required by the new Rule.
Because the sanctions available to a court vary considerably, the extent of due
process provided to those subject to sanctions probably will vary as well.
Even if the courts could devise ways of applying the new standards fairly and
effectively, the success of the amendments remains doubtful because the amendments
fail to affect the adversarial nature of lawyers. Seventy years ago, Dean Roscoe
169. Informal Judicial Survey, supra note 145.
170. Id.
171. FED. R. civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee notes.
172. See Note, supra note 20, at 1052-54.
173. Id.
174. Informal Judicial Survey, supra note 145.
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Pound attacked the overbearing contentiousness of the American adversary system by
stating that it "was perverting the adversary idea into a sporting contest." 175 Dean
Pound's attack appears equally true today. More recently, Professor Brazil has
described how "the adversary character of civil discovery, with substantial reinforce-
ment from the economic structure of our legal system, promotes practices that sys-
tematically impede the attainment of the principal purposes for which discovery was
designed." 1
76
Despite the heralding of the new Rules "as counterweights to the demand of
zealous representation," 177 it appears that the drafters once again may have under-
estimated how tenaciously attorneys would cling to the adversarial system. Attorneys
are essentially unchanged ethically by the Rules-they remain bound under Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility to represent their clients "zealously within
the bounds of the law. ... 178 Their loyalty to a "professional ethic that compels
advocates to pursue the best resolution possible for their clients without regard to the
merits of the dispute" 179 remains unshaken. Anything less could expose attorneys to
malpractice suits and professional disciplinary proceedings, not to mention loss of
professional esteem and economic advantages. Professor Brazil's criticism of the
1980 Amendments may apply to the most recent amendments as well since "[n]one
of the changes ... purport to convert adversary attorneys into allies."'18
0
The adversarial nature of trial lawyers could combine with the new Rule to
produce a new kind of discovery abuse-abuse of the sanctioning process itself.
Moving for sanctions whenever an opponent serves a discovery request could become
standard procedure for attorneys trained to expose every weakness of their adver-
sary's case while endeavoring to hide every flaw of their own. The only restraints on
this type of abuse will be the attentiveness of judges and the historical reluctance of
lawyers to seek sanctions for fear that they may someday be in their adversary's
position. The latter restraint, the traditional reluctance to move for discovery sanc-
tions, probably will erode with time and with increased knowledge of how the new
Rule can be manipulated. The success and effectiveness of the former restraint, the
attentiveness of the trial judge, is much harder to predict.
Several commentators are already fearful of the wide authority the 1983 amend-
ments gave to trial judges.' 8' These commentators argue that expanded opportunities
for abuse of judicial power will result as the Rules transform judges from adjudicators
to administrators. Instead of reducing court congestion and the amount of time judges
175. Burger, supra note 5, at 91; see also Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964) (originally published in 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906)).
176. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv.
1295, 1296 (1978); see also Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 Onto ST. L.J. 713
(1983).
177. Lempert, Rules Committee Takes Big Bite at Discovery Excess, Legal Times, July 13, 1981, at 8, col. 1.
178. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONStrnLin EC 7-1 (1979); cf. MODEL RutES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1.3 (1983).
179. Brazil, supra note 176, at 1312.
180. Id. at 1345.
181. See, e.g., Girdner, New Rules Would Give More Power to Federal Judges: Opposition Expected, L.A.
Daily J., May 11, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
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spend on each case, the Rules could add managerial duties that will detract from the
quality of judicial decisions.
Although the judges responding to the Informal Judicial Survey did not agree
that the new Rule grants too much authority to district court judges, several believed
that the new Rule cuts in the wrong direction. One judge stated flatly that "less
judicial time should be spent in discovery disputes."' 82 The participants were over-
whelmingly pessimistic in their beliefs that the new discovery Rules will not change
the way discovery is conducted in the cases they hear.' 83
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the avalanche of commentary triggered by the 1983 adoption of the
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the new Rules appear to have
produced few changes in the way discovery is sought and sanctioned. The residual
reluctance of judges to impose sanctions has been helped along in its gradual decline
by Rule 26(g) and the Advisory Committee Notes, but no great rush to the courthouse
door by lawyers seeking sanctions has begun.
Perhaps the skepticism that greeted earlier efforts to curb discovery abuse is
stemming the predicted tidal wave of satellite litigation. Perhaps lawyers and judges
are too uncertain of how the new Rule should be applied to risk moving for sanctions
under Rule 26(g). Perhaps litigators have not yet learned that the Rule's sanctioning
scalpel can be used as a new weapon of harassment against their adversaries. What-
ever the reason, it is difficult to predict when, or whether, changes in current discov-
ery practices will occur. It is clear, however, that it is up to the federal judges to make
the new Rules work. The Rules will not make themselves work, nor will attorneys
make them work. The 1983 amendments require judges to reevaluate their roles and
shoulder new managerial burdens. Only if judges are willing to accept these new
responsibilities, despite their overcrowded dockets and in the face of strong critical
opposition, will the new Rules achieve any effective discovery reform.
Margaret L. Weissbrod
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